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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to illustrate, with a simple three-region
(located on a line), two-good (homogeneous good/differentiated high-
tech products), two-factor (labor/“footloose” capital) model, how falling
transport costs can affect firms’ location decisions and trade structure.
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It is shown that the locational advantage of a central hub is magnified
via firms’ location decisions.
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1 Introduction
In recent decades competing new economic geography theories have sug-
gested that deeper economic integration might serve to change industry struc-
ture among regions (or countries).1 For the sake of mathematical tractabil-
ity, however, geographical space in these studies is symmetric (e.g, two-
symmetric regions or many symmetric regions located on a circle). Contrary
to that, the role of an “entrepoˆt,” which is a hub area that imports a good
from a neighbor and re-exports at least part of the same good to another,
gained the attention of economists (e.g., Feenstra and Hanson, 2004; and
Endoh, Hamada and Shimomura, 2008). Also, it is increasingly recognized
that some locational advantages of a hub due to the asymmetric location of
regions or countries play a crucial role in such trade flows. This seems to
suggest that the traditional focus on symmetric locational settings should be
accompanied by a focus on asymmetric settings.
In a recent influential contribution involving the asymmetric location of
regions, Ago, Isono and Tabuchi (2006) analyzed the impacts of falling trans-
port costs on the spatial distribution of economic activities by comparing two
representative models of economic geography (i.e., Krugman, 1991, 1993; and
Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse, 2002). By considering a network economy
1See, for example, Fujita, Krugman and Venbles (1999) and Baldwin et al. (2003).
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consisting of three regions on a line, they show that firms in an increasing re-
turns sector will tend to locate in the central region in the Krugman model,
while firms tend to move away from the center in the Ottaviano-Tabuchi-
Thisse model.2 Note that some of their results depend on the manufacturing
workers’ mobility among regions: since immigrant workers spend their in-
come locally, demand-linked circular causality emerges.
However, in a global environment, it is often observed that higher trans-
action costs hinder workers from cross-border movement. Instead, “footloose
capital” often moves from one country to other. According to these observa-
tions, the present study focuses on the role of footloose capital (hereafter FC)
in determining the spatial distribution of economic activities in asymmetric
locations. The purpose of this study is to illustrate, with a simple three-region
(located on a line), two-good (homogeneous good/differentiated high-tech
products), two-factor (labor/“footloose” capital) model, how falling trans-
port costs can affect firms’ location decisions and the nature of the trading
equilibrium.
There are two major advantages for this formulation of FC. First, since
the FC model does not rely on worker migration, it is plausible to interpret
the three regions as separate nations, which is more suitable for the analysis
2They concluded that the sharp contrats between the two models are ascribed to the
difference in the degree of price competition.
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of international trade and capital flows. The second reason is a technical one:
the Krugman model is not analytically solvable due to its high nonlinearity
(simulations are needed to obtain satisfactory results).3 In contrast, by using
the FC model, one can obtain the closed forms of variables.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the impacts of falling
transport costs on industrial location.
2 The Model
Let us consider a network economy consisting of three regions (or countries)
r = 1, 2, 3, each with two factors (capital, K, and labor, L) and two types
of goods (a homogeneous good and a large variety of differentiated high-tech
products). Each region is endowed with K units of capital and L units of
labor. Assume that the regions are identical in regard to tastes, size, and
technology, but differ with respect to location. They are evenly distributed
along a line such that Region 2 is the central region and the distance between
Region 1 and Region 2 is equal to that between Region 2 and Region 3.
Consumers have Cobb-Douglas preferences over both categories and spend
fraction µ of their income on high-tech products. The “iceberg”type of trans-
port technology is assumed: if t (t > 1) units of high-tech product are shipped
3See Krugman (1991, 1993) and Ago, Isono, and Tabuchi (2006).
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from one region to the next region, only one unit arrives. Therefore, if it is
shipped from Region 3 to Region 1, t2 units must be shipped in order for
one unit to be received. Region 1’s price index for high-tech products is
represented by the Dixit-Stiglitz form:
P1 =
[
n1(p1)
1−σ + n2(tp2)
1−σ + n3(t2p3)
1−σ]1/(1−σ)
, σ > 1 (1)
where σ is the degree of substitution between every products, pr is the pro-
ducer price for high-tech products produced in Region r, and nr is the number
of varieties produced in Region r, respectively.4
The demands of consumers in Region 1 for a Region 1 (c11) variety, a
Region 2 (c12) variety, and a Region 3 (c13) variety are respectively
c11 = p
−σ
1 P
σ−1
1 µE1, (2)
c12 = (tp2)
−σP σ−11 µE1, (3)
c13 = (t
2p3)
−σ
P σ−11 µE1, (4)
where E1 is the total income of Region 1.
The homogeneous good is produced under Walrasian conditions (constant
returns and perfect competition) using only labor as an input. Units are
chosen so that one unit of labor produces one unit of output. As usual in
new geography models, no transport costs exist for the homogeneous good,
4Price indices in other regions (P2 and P3) are defined in a similar way.
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which serves to tie down the wage rate. Also assume that the parameters of
the model are such that all countries produce the homogeneous good; thus,
constant, identical wages for labor hold (hereafter set to unity).
The production of each variety of high-tech product requires one unit of
capital and β units of labor per unit of output. As in Martin and Rogers
(1995) and Martin and Ottaviano (1999), one of the central assumptions
is that the capital is “footloose”: although it is firm-specific, it moves freely
between regions. Then, if a variety developed by Region 1 capital is produced
in Region 2 (or Region 3), the operating profits are repatriated to Region-1.
Given a Dixit-Stiglitz specification with constant elasticity σ, each firm sets
its price as p1 = p2 = p3 = (βσ)/(σ − 1). By choice of units, one can set
β = (σ − 1)/σ to have
p1 = p2 = p3 = 1. (5)
Given that one unit of capital is required to develop a variety, the payment
for each unit of capital employed in Region i, pii, must satisfy,
pii = pixi − βxi = xi/σ, (6)
where xi is the output of a representative firm in Region i. When capital
mobility is unrestricted, the payment for capital will be equalized between
regions, which implies that pi1 = pi2 = pi3 and thus
x1 = x2 = x3. (7)
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3 Trade Liberalization and the Locational Ad-
vantage of a Hub
Now consider the firms’ location decisions. The product market equilibrium
in Region 1 requires that supply equal demand for each variety: x1 = c11 +
tc12 + t
2c13. Similarly, product market equilibrium conditions for Region 2
and Region 3 are x2 = tc21+c22+tc23 and x3 = t
2c31+tc32+c33, respectively.
Substituting (2), (3), (4), and corresponding conditions into these conditions
and setting µEi = µ(rK+L) = 1 yields the following equilibrium conditions:
x1 =
1
n1 + τn2 + τ 2n3
+
τ
τn1 + n2 + τn3
+
τ 2
τ 2n1 + τn2 + n3
, (8)
x2 =
τ
n1 + τn2 + τ 2n3
+
1
τn1 + n2 + τn3
+
τ
τ 2n1 + τn2 + n3
, (9)
x3 =
τ 2
n1 + τn2 + τ 2n3
+
τ
τn1 + n2 + τn3
+
1
τ 2n1 + τn2 + n3
, (10)
where τ ≡ t1−σ (τ ≤ 1) measures the freeness of trade. Falling transport
costs are represened by an increase in τ .
Using (7), (8), (9) and (10), the equilibrium number of Region 1 firms
can be obtained:5
n1 =
(1− 2τ)
3(1− τ)2 (n1 + n2 + n3), (11)
5Note that n3 can be obtained in a similar way. Since the total number of varieties in
the world is fixed, n2 can also be obtained.
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dn1
dτ
= − 2τ
3(1− τ)3 (n1 + n2 + n3) < 0,
d2n1
dτ 2
= −2(1 + 2τ)
3(1− τ)4 (n1 + n2 + n3) < 0.
I would like to emphasize that the major advantage of FC modeling is to
obtain a closed form solution, which makes the role of a hub much easier to
understand. Equation (11) conveys the important impact of trade liberaliza-
tion in a setting with asymmetric location.
Proposition 1: As trade in goods is liberalized, the center attracts capital
from the periphery.
Figure 1 illustrates the implications of this proposition. The horizontal
axis shows the level of freeness of trade (τ) and the vertical axis shows the
equilibrium number of varieties in each region (nr). The central region’s
share in the production of high-tech products increases continuously from
full dispersion to full agglomeration.6 As each region is endowed with an
equal amount of capital, the bold arrows show the capital outflow from the
periphery (K − n1, K − n3): capital outflows from the periphery increase as
goods trade is liberalized.
Now let us turn to the welfare aspect of trade liberalization. In the
present model, only price changes affect utility is the one with the price
6Note that full agglomeration occurs when τ = 1/2.
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index: a larger reduction in the price index implies larger gains from trade.
By simple calculations, the following condition can be obtained:
dP2
dτ
<
dP1
dτ
=
dP3
dτ
< 0. (12)
While each region gains from trade liberalization, gains in the center are
amplified the most in an asymmetric setting, which is the source of the
locational advantage of a hub.
Proposition 2: Capital outflow from the periphery to the center becomes a
source of unequal trade gains among regions.
In a world with footloose capital, the center region attracts capital from
the periphery due to lower transport costs, which becomes a source of an
unequal distribution of trade gains. Although trade liberalization reduces
import transaction costs, it also induces capital outflow from the peripheral
regions and may raise total transaction costs in such regions. The possibility
of capital outflow provides some theoretical grounds for unequal incentives
for regional economic integration. Further research should focus on these
policy implications.
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